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 RESUMO  
Eventos comportamentais privados são aqueles eventos nos quais a estimulação com relação à qual um indivíduo 
responde não é acessível do ponto de vista de outra pessoa. Nestes casos, a estimulação pode ser verbal ou não verbal. Além 
disso, as respostas em relação a essa estimulação podem ser verbais ou não verbais e acessíveis ou não a outros. Um tipo de 
evento privado envolve relatos verbais ocasionados por condições do corpo, tais como desconfortos ou dores. Um segundo 
tipo envolve comportamento operante encoberto, tal como pensamento, resolução de problemas e devaneio (daydreaming). 
Para cada tipo, uma explicação naturalística pode ser desenvolvida baseada em conceitos derivados da análise do 
comportamento aberto. 
Palavras-chave: B. F. Skinner, eventos comportamentais privados, problema da privacidade, resolução de 
problemas, pensamento, relatos verbais. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Private behavioral events are those events in which the stimulation with respect to which an individual responds is 
not accessible from the vantage point of another person.  In such cases, the stimulation may be verbal or nonverbal.  Further, 
the responses with respect to this stimulation may be verbal or nonverbal, and accessible or not to others.  One type of private 
event involves verbal reports occasioned by conditions of the body, such as aches and pains.  A second type involves covert 
operant behavior, such as thinking, problem solving, and daydreaming.  For each type, a naturalistic account may be 
developed based on concepts derived from the analysis of overt behavior. 
Key words: B. F. Skinner, private behavioral events, problem of privacy, problem solving, thinking, verbal reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
This article is taken from material I developed over the years to help in my own teaching on the topic of private behavioral events in 
behavior analysis.  I offer it here in the hope others will find it useful.  In keeping with the instructional goal of the article, references are at 
a minimum.  In addition, both the language and the arguments are more informal than in other articles.  If I have fallen short in the 
execution, I apologize and ask for the reader’s tolerance.  I can only say the contingencies haven’t finished with me yet.  Correspondence 
concerning the article should be addressed to the author at jcm@uwm.edu, or at his home address:  1861 E. Fox Lane; Fox Point, WI 
53217; USA. 
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PRIVATE BEHAVIORAL EVENTS 
When we say we respond with respect to the 
environment, we are usually speaking of an environment that 
is publicly observable. However, in some instances we 
respond with respect to stimulation in a part of the 
environment that is not accessible from the vantage point of 
others. Rather, it is accessible only to ourselves, for 
example, because it is inside our skin.  These instances may 
be called “private behavioral events.” These forms of 
stimulation may be either verbal or nonverbal. In addition, 
the responses we make to such stimulation may be either 
nonverbal or verbal, and either observed and accessible to 
others, or unobserved and inaccessible. This article seeks to 
describe the nature of and importance of these private 
behavioral events to an understanding of behavior (e.g., 
Skinner, 1953). 
 
TWO TYPES OF PRIVATE BEHAVIORAL EVENTS 
Let us begin by identifying two types of private 
behavioral events. The first type involves the events that 
take place when we learn to talk about our sensations and 
feelings, such as when we talk about our aches and pains. 
The second type involves the events that take place when 
covert forms of behavior develop and influence us, such as 
when we think and solve problems.  Both types of private 
events occur commonly enough, and it is incumbent on a 
science of behavior to account for them in naturalistic ways. 
We may do so using the same analytical and explanatory 
terms and concepts that we use to account for public 
behavioral events. 
 
Private Behavioral Events of the First Type: Verbal 
Reports About Our Sensations and Feelings 
What we feel are internal conditions of our bodies.  
These conditions arise during the process of living, for 
example, as our metabolic processes take place or as we 
contact environmental events, variables, and relations. In 
turn, we contact these internal conditions through our 
interoceptive and possibly proprioceptive nervous systems. 
The important question here concerns how we learn to talk 
meaningfully about these internal conditions.  A moment’s 
reflection tells us that this question is important for parents, 
who want to encourage their children to talk about their 
aches and pains (“Where does it hurt?”) so that the parents 
can relieve their children’s problems. 
We begin our answer by noting that verbal reports 
occasioned by our sensations and feelings are operant 
responses. Operant responses occur because of 
contingencies: the systematic relation among antecedent 
discriminative stimuli, the response, and the reinforcing 
consequence of the response. Verbal behavior of any sort 
develops and is maintained through the differential 
reinforcement delivered by the verbal community. 
Consider how the verbal community teaches 
children to say that acai berries are purple.  Here, the 
purple berries are public and directly accessible to both the 
verbal community and the children. The verbal 
community can reinforce the children’s response of 
saying “purple” in the presence of purple acai berries and 
not otherwise. 
A moment’s reflection suggests circumstances 
are different when the verbal community teaches children 
to say they are in pain.  Here, the verbal community is not 
in direct contact with an internal condition as the 
occasion on which to differentially reinforce talk about it, 
such that the condition readily acquires the stimulus 
control necessary for us to talk meaningfully about it.  
This handicap is called “the problem of privacy.” Thus, 
the matter of how verbal behavior about our internal 
conditions develops represents a problem concerning how 
the appropriate stimulus control develops over verbal 
behavior when the discriminative circumstances are 
private.  Yet, children obviously do learn to talk at least 
somewhat meaningfully about their internal conditions. It 
follows, then, that the verbal community works around 
this handicap. The relevant question is, How does it do 
so? 
The verbal community circumvents the problem 
of privacy by using public circumstances correlated with 
the private, internal condition as the basis for delivering 
the necessary differential reinforcement. One case 
involves our “collateral responses.” When children have 
been injured, or when they have an ache or a pain, they 
might touch, massage, or hold the afflicted area. If their 
leg hurts, they might limp.  If their back is sore, they 
might walk hunched over, with a stooped posture. If their 
tooth hurts, they might hold their jaw. Their behavior of 
touching, massaging, or holding the afflicted area, or of 
walking with a limp or stooped over, constitutes the 
“collateral response.”  On these occasions and not 
otherwise, the verbal community reinforces children’s 
talk of being in pain (e.g., at least through its approval, 
understanding, and sympathy, if not also pain-relieving 
attention). 
A second case involves “public 
accompaniments.” When children have been jabbed with 
a sharp object, the verbal community encourages children 
to talk of having a “sharp pain.” When children have been 
struck with a dull object, the verbal community 
encourages children to talk of having a “dull pain.” When 
children have been burned by a hot stove, the verbal 
community encourages children to talk of having a 
“burning pain.”  Being jabbed the sharp object, being 
stuck with a dull object, or touching the hot stove 
constitute the “public accompaniments,” and the verbal 
community differentially reinforces children’s talk of 
being in pain, and presumably does not do so otherwise.  
Moreover, the verbal community often encourages 
children’s talk about a particular quality of that pain, if 
only as a kind of metaphorical relation, as in sharp, dull, 
or burning. Parents encourage their children to talk of 
such pains because the parents may then be able to 
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alleviate the pain, or even to take action to prevent 
children from injuring themselves and experiencing such 
pains in the future. 
We see that when collateral responses and public 
accompaniments are involved, the verbal community 
differentially reinforces speakers when both public and 
private stimulation are present. The public stimulation is the 
collateral responses and public accompaniments, and the 
private stimulation is the internal conditions that come 
about through the processes of living and interacting with 
the environment. Because both public and private 
stimulation are present, both acquire stimulus control.  
Later, individuals are able to talk under the discriminative 
control of just the private stimulation of the internal 
condition when it occurs, even though public correlates in 
the form of collateral responses or public accompaniments 
are not involved. 
We can interject here to note that some individuals 
learn to exploit the processes described above. The terms 
malingerers and hypochondriacs are sometimes applied to 
these individuals. These individuals make statements 
seemingly about such debilitating internal conditions as 
aches and pains because by doing so the individuals escape 
from an aversive situation or gain some benefit—if only the 
attention of others, rather than because their verbal behavior 
is under the discriminative control of some internal stimulus 
condition that is actually present. The individuals are later 
revealed as malingerers or hypochondriacs when we do not 
observe collateral responses or public accompaniments that 
are ordinarily correlated with such statements. 
A third case of private behavioral events is an 
extension of the two cases—collateral responses and public 
accompaniments - outlined above. This third case involves 
stimulus generalization. Here, after tacts are acquired 
regarding the internal conditions, we later talk in a similar 
way when we experience similar sensations and feelings, 
even though collateral responses or public accompaniments 
have not been directly involved. For instance, speakers may 
report a burning pain after scraping the skin on their knees, 
even though no hot stove is involved. In other instances, 
nervous speakers or performers may say “I feel like I have 
butterflies in my stomach” before an important lecture or 
recital, where the fluttering sensations in their stomachs 
resemble those of a butterfly landing on their arms. 
As an aside, we note that intimately related 
processes take place during toilet training, when caregivers 
teach those under their care how to eliminate full bladders 
or bowels in socially acceptable ways, given the presence of 
private stimulation. For example, caregivers might look for 
fidgeting that indicates full bladders, or have children drink 
large amounts of fruit juice, to predispose socially 
acceptable modes of urination that can then be reinforced. 
Private Behavioral Events of the Second Type: Covert 
Behavior 
We also sometimes engage in covert behavior, 
typically covert operant behavior. Covert behavior is 
generally acquired in overt form. Often, it then becomes 
covert based on experiences during our lifetimes. What 
experiences might lead overt behavior to become covert? In 
some cases, the behavior becomes covert because the overt 
form is punished. For example, we learn to read aloud.  
However, if others around us punish our reading aloud, for 
example, in a library, we shift to reading silently. We can 
also covertly explore alternative possibilities, such as which 
card to play in a card game or which piece to move in a 
chess match. By so doing, we avoid potentially punishing 
consequences of losing the trick or piece. In other instances, 
the behavior becomes covert because it is expedient. For 
example, we can often solve simple math problems “in our 
heads” faster than writing out the solution with paper and 
pencil, and especially so when we don’t have paper and 
pencil. An important point is that the covert behavior is 
executed by the same response system as overt behavior, just 
reduced in scale. In this regard, consider so-called “mental 
math”. The term is a misnomer. It is behavioral math. The 
activity typically consists of breaking down a math problem 
into a series of smaller steps that can be carried out covertly 
without the loss of stimulus control that often accompanies 
covert stimulation. 
In some cases, the function of covert behavior is to 
contribute to discriminative control, as in “thinking” and 
problem solving. We typically make contact with covert 
behavioral events through our proprioceptive and possibly 
interoceptive nervous systems. The discriminative function 
of covert behavior does not ultimately differ from that of 
overt behavior, and covert behavior does not achieve 
anything beyond the overt form, apart from possibly 
avoiding punishment. Often but not necessarily our covert 
behavior is verbal. Special cases are perceptual processes, as 
when our past history leads us to visually imagine a solution 
to a problem, such as when we move a piece on a chess 
board. Classically conditioned seeing might also occur, as 
when we glance at a circle that has a gap and is incomplete 
but perceive it as complete because the circles we have seen 
and with which we have had experience to that point in our 
lives have always been complete.   Finally, covert behavior 
does not always occur. Even when it does, it may not 
influence the overt behavior. When it does occur and 
influence overt behavior, its influence may be viewed as a 
link in a chain. 
In other cases, covert behavior can be reinforcing in 
its own right, as when we daydream or fantasize about some 
favored object, event, person, or course of action. One 
related case is Freudian rationalization, where individuals 
supply a reason after the fact to justify their actions.  By so 
doing, the individuals avoid the unpleasantness of 
demonstrably irrational actions, as well as possibly the 
punishment from others. Another related case is that of 
obsessive-compulsive tendencies, where individuals talk 
themselves into performing some action because they fear 
what will happen if they don’t perform the action. Again, 
individuals probably feel better after saying or perhaps only 
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starting to say such things to themselves, much as they 
would feel if someone else said the same things to them. 
Therapy is often aimed at correcting such troublesome forms 
of private events. 
Often the question arises as to how our own 
behavior can be a stimulus. The answer is straightforward: 
just as any other event can be a stimulus.  To clarify this 
matter, let’s consider an example. Close your eyes. Now 
raise one finger or two, your choice. Keep your eyes closed.  
How many fingers did you raise? Now think about raising 
one finger or two, your choice, but don’t actually raise a 
finger. How many fingers did you think about raising? Your 
behavior of actually raising your finger(s) is a discriminative 
stimulus - an event, hence an occasion - for a subsequent 
response, in this case your verbal report about how many 
fingers you raised. We can say the same thing concerning 
your behavior of thinking that you are raising your finger. In 
each case, you were in contact with your behavior, whether 
in its overt or covert form, through your proprioceptive-
kinesthetic sense, plus possibly your interoceptive sense, 
rather than exteroceptive sight, sound, touch, taste, or smell. 
Exactly how central (e.g., inchoate, incipient, fragmentary, 
unobservable to others, as in thinking about raising your 
finger) as opposed to peripheral (e.g., fully executed, 
observable to others, as in actually raising your finger) a 
response must be for an individual to be in contact with it 
and have it exert discriminative control over subsequent 
behavior depends on individual circumstances. Feeling a 
sneeze coming on is surely a common enough example.  In 
exceptional cases mathematicians may solve complicated 
problems or generate proofs very quickly, based on incipient 
properties of covert responses. Skilled computer 
programmers do much the same. Composers may generate a 
musical score in similar ways. Again, such skills depend on 
a lengthy history. The time-honored “Aha!” experience may 
be understood as another example of a response to incipient 
stages of a response. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
A final topic is consciousness. Consciousness is 
indeed another time-honored topic in the history of 
psychology. It is often taken in traditional psychology to be 
a kind of private phenomenon from another domain, such as 
a mental or cognitive domain, that mediates the relation 
between environmental circumstances as input and behavior 
as output. Radical behaviorists have quite a different 
understanding of consciousness. For radical behaviorists, 
consciousness means responding with respect to oneself, 
where the responses are private or public, verbal or 
nonverbal. 
In some instances, the responding is with respect to 
the internal conditions of our bodies, such as when we 
verbally report our sensations and feelings. When we 
respond to ourselves, our responding may well be verbal. 
When it is verbal, it owes its strength to the verbal 
community. For example, the verbal community may ask us 
how we are feeling. The processes that are involved in this 
case are reviewed earlier, when we reviewed how verbal 
reports about internal conditions develop. 
As an aside, we note that early in the history of 
psychology, some researchers thought that individuals could 
verbally report as many as 42,415 different sensations. 
Radical behaviorists think this number is fanciful for two 
reasons. First, we don’t have enough nerves going to the 
right places to allow us to discern this many internal 
conditions of our bodies, apart from whether that many 
conditions could even be produced.  Second, even if we did 
have enough nerves, the verbal community can’t reinforce 
responses precisely enough to bring about such fine-grain 
discriminations, as it might be able to do with such public 
stimulation as colors or musical notes. 
In other instances, the responding is with respect to 
our past, present, or likely future behavior and the 
circumstances of which that behavior was, is, or is likely to 
be a function. The verbal community may also ask us what 
we have done in the past, what we are doing now, and what 
we are likely to do in the future, and what contingencies are 
responsible for such behavior. The verbal community may 
then reinforce through approval of socially reasonable 
answers. 
When we respond with respect to our own 
behavior, the behavior with respect to which we are 
responding may be either overt or covert, and the responses 
we make to our own behavior may be either overt or covert, 
verbal or nonverbal. The processes that are involved in these 
cases are reviewed earlier, when we reviewed how covert 
behavior develops and influences us.  Discriminative control 
that emerges from that covert behavior is the critical feature. 
Being conscious may therefore be understood as 
behavioral not mental in nature and a social product. Again, 
overt responding with respect to ourselves is not a measure 
of an unobservable mental state of consciousness. Rather, it 
is what consciousness has always and only ever meant, 
despite the many mischievous other ways that traditional 
psychology conceives of its meaning. Consciousness is an 
important topic because our behavior with respect to 
ourselves is relevant to self-knowledge and self-
management. If we know more about ourselves, in the sense 
of what we are feeling, what we are doing, and why, we can 
better manage our lives and more effectively interact with 
features of our material environment and other persons in 
our social environment. 
WHY DO RADICAL BEHAVIORISTS ARGUE IN 
FAVOR OF PRIVATE BEHAVIORAL EVENTS? 
Radical behaviorists do not conceive of an 
organism as literally empty, do not ignore or deny events 
inside the skin, and do not remain strictly at the level of 
observable relations involving stimulation and responses.  
Private behavioral events may be undeniably relevant to an 
understanding of a given instance of behavior as an act in 
context, even though they are inaccessible or unobservable 
from the vantage point of another.  As real events, they may 
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be included in the understanding of behavior using the same 
terms and concepts as external, observable events, variables, 
and relations. 
The radical behaviorist position on private 
behavioral events is neither mentalism nor methodological 
behaviorism. The position is not mentalism because (a) the 
responses are part of the behavioral domain, not a mental 
domain; (b) the responses are executed by the same response 
systems as overt responses, just reduced in magnitude; and 
(c) both the origins and effects of private behavioral events 
on subsequent behavior are functionally related to 
environmental circumstances. Thus, for radical behaviorists 
private behavioral events are very different from the wide 
variety of causal mental or cognitive states and processes 
that traditional psychology posits as necessary for an 
explanation. 
Similarly, the radical behaviorist position on private 
behavioral events is not methodological behaviorism 
because the radical behaviorist position speaks directly about 
the possible functional relevance of covert behavioral 
events, even though they are unobservable to others. Radical 
behaviorism does not try to gain agreement and make 
analytical or explanatory talk of phenomena from an 
unobservable mental domain scientifically respectable by 
appealing to observable data in an operational definition. 
Thus, overt behavior is not a measure of the mental or 
cognitive process of thinking.  Rather, thinking is a form of 
behavior in and of itself, distinguished by its discriminative 
or reinforcing function. To be sure, until our technology 
improves and a second person can directly access the 
otherwise private events of a first, from the vantage point of 
the second person the private events of the first are an 
inference, but for the first, the private events are no 
inference. 
 
WHAT IS THE CAUSAL STATUS OF PRIVATE 
BEHAVIORAL EVENTS? 
What then is the causal status of private events? 
With respect to the first type of private behavioral event—
verbal reports about sensations and feelings, the conditions 
felt serve as forms of discriminative stimulation for verbal 
reports about them. However, for analytic purposes we need 
to trace the source of the behavior often attributed to the 
feelings and sensations back in time to the environmental 
events, variables, and relations that give rise to the feelings 
and sensations, not stop at the level of the feelings and 
sensations themselves. 
With respect to the second type of private 
behavioral event - covert behavior, such behavior is causal 
in the sense it can contribute to discriminative control over 
subsequent behavior, for example, through its participation 
as a link in a chain of responses extended over time.  
Whether it actually does is an empirical question. Again, 
covert behavior does not automatically and necessarily occur 
in every instance of behavior.  When it does occur, it does 
not automatically and necessarily influence subsequent 
behavior. Rather, covert behavior may contribute to 
discriminative control through individuals’ experiences 
during their lifetimes. The extent to which it actually does so 
depends on those experiences. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, if we cannot explain in a naturalistic 
way how we learn to talk about what we feel, or how we 
learn to think, the alternative is some sort of mentalistic 
account that we just do, perhaps according to some type of 
private language, but this is not a reasonable account at all.  
The concept of private behavioral events offers a 
comprehensive scientific account based on thoroughgoing 
behavioral principles, rather than an account based on the 
explanatory fictions of mental states and processes. 
 
Important terms and concepts: Problem of privacy, 
private behavioral events, collateral responses, public 
accompaniments, coincident properties, stimulus 
generalization, thinking, problem solving, discriminative 
function of covert operant behavior, automatically 
reinforcing function of covert operant behavior, conditioned 
seeing, operant seeing. 
 
REFERENCE 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Private events in a natural science. In 
B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (pp. 257-
282). New York: Macmillan. 
 
Submitted: 03/28/2018 
Accepted: 04/21/2018 
 
